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ABSTRACT
We explore the impact of financing constraints and the role of
banking markets integration on the growth of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). The data are drawn from the European Central
Bank/Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (ECB/SAFE) on
SMEs’ access to finance aggregated at the country level for the
largest 11 euro area countries during 2009–2015. Our findings
suggest that financing constraints hamper SMEs’ growth and that
the effect is stronger for perceived, rather than actual, financing
constraints. On the other hand, increased banking markets inte-
gration in the euro area appears to foster SMEs’ growth.
Furthermore, we found that the reduction in financing constraints
is crucial in the transmission channel from banking markets inte-
gration to growth. This effect appears significantly stronger when
integration is measured by the intensity of cross-border lending
than through convergence in interest rates to loans to nonfinancial
corporations.
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Introduction
How does access to finance in the euro area impact on the growth of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs)? To what extent does integration in banking mar-
kets play a role in reducing financing constraints for small businesses? In this
article, we attempt to answer these important questions and adopt a broad
definition of access to finance to include demand and supply side factors. The
theoretical and empirical literature on the financing behavior of firms is domi-
nated by two capital structure theories1; namely, the trade-off (Kraus &
Litzenberger, 1973) and pecking order theories (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf,
1984). Conversely, financial intermediation theories (Diamond, 1984; Leland &
Pyle, 1977) focus on the characteristics and nature of bank relationships and the
role of signaling (for example, internal financing and collateral) in reducing
credit rationing. According to this view, debt contracts are the optimal methods
of financing, and relationship lending can improve information quality. In this
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study, we focus on the banking sector as main supplier of small business credit.
Although recent years have witnessed a considerable growth in nontraditional
finance options (for example, fintech activities such as peer-to-peer lending
platforms), in Europe they remain niche products and banks still provide
much of the fuel for SMEs’ growth. On the demand side for small business
credit, financing constraints are viewed from the perspective of the firm seeking
external capital to support its growth thus uses firm-level data to measure them.
The supply approach considers the impact of the availability and cost of external
financing in the European Union (EU) single market and explores whether and
to what extent more integrated banking markets reduce loan prices and increase
credit availability, thereby benefiting euro area small andmedium firms’ growth.
If a more integrated banking market is found to be conducive to growth, then
important policy implications can implicitly be drawn.
The conventional approach to measuring financing constraints relies on
financial statement proxies such as cash flow at the firm level. However, the
increased availability of survey data for SMEs has allowed researchers tomeasure
constraints more directly especially as far as bank financing is concerned. In this
article, we adopted an approach à la Ferrando andMulier (2015) that allowed us
to distinguish between actual and perceived external bank financing constraints
(for more details, see the subsection Financing constraints as a barrier for
growth). The use of both measures not only provided us with a means to
check the validity of our main results, but also allowed us to assess the accuracy
of firms’ perceptions about the impact of their financing difficulties on the
realized growth. Survey data is especially adequate for exploring this type of
insight. Based on previous literature (Bottazzi, Secchi, & Tamagni, 2014; Beck &
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; and others), we expected
a negative association between the share of constrained firms and the SMEs’
sector growth.
In this article we sought to test not only whether there are direct effects of
banking integration on firm growth (defined as growth in sales), but also
potential indirect effects through the impact of banking integration on
financing constraints. The choice to focus on the banking markets was
further motivated by the fact that SMEs are typically more dependent on
banks for external finance compared to larger firms that can more easily
access market finance (Berger & Udell, 1995; Bremus & Neugebauer, 2018;
Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994). SMEs in the euro area can be particularly vulner-
able to unfavorable developments in banking markets conditions, as shown
in recent years. These markets have experienced an increase in the level of
cross-country dispersion in interest rates to loans for nonfinancial corpora-
tions (NFCs) (Arnold and van Ewijk, 2014; Rughoo & Sarantis, 2012),
together with a pronounced reduction in the level of cross-border lending
in the years following the onset of the global financial crisis. Evidence shows
that the crisis has indeed had a persistent effect on integration in the euro
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area banking markets. With regard to cross-border lending, Bremus and
Fratzscher (2015) show that the growth in cross-border claims has not
significantly picked up after the crisis. They also found that the home bias
has risen sharply leading to more segmented credit markets especially in
the euro area, and attribute this to changes in monetary and regulatory
policies. Similarly, with regard to convergence in interest rates, Arnold and
van Ewijk (2014) argue that heterogeneity in sovereign risk is to a large
extent responsible for the increased cross-sectional dispersion in lending and
deposit rates.
Since the start of the global financial crisis, there has been a growing
literature analyzing various ways in which the crisis might have affected
SMEs’ access to bank finance (Carbó-Valverde, Rodríguez-Fernádez, &
Udell, 2016; Ferrando & Mulier, 2015; Casey & O’Toole, 2014; Drakos,
2013; Canton, Grilo, Monteagudo, & van der Zwan, 2013; Vermoesen,
Deloof, & Laveren, 2013; Kremp & Sevestre, 2013; Holton, Lawless, &
McCann, 2013 and others). Using data from the crisis period, our study
investigates whether increased banking market integration can have
a beneficial effect on SMEs’ access to bank finance. We hypothesize
a positive effect as increased markets integration is expected to expand the
range of available financing sources while reducing their cost (for example,
Lucey & Zhang, 2011). Integration in banking markets can be assessed in
different ways. In this study, we employed two measures that proxy for
supply and cost of funds in an integrated market. The first measure refers
to the intensity of the flow of bank funds to borrowers across borders and
assumes that, under full financial integration, the flow of funds across
borders is not hampered by financial frictions. It is essentially a quantity-
based measure (ECB, 2015), calculated as the country-share of monetary
financial institutions’ (MFIs) cross-border lending to nonfinancial corpora-
tions located in the other euro area countries in total lending to NFCs.
The second measure was constructed under the law of one price concept
according to which, in integrated financial markets, the price of similar-risk
assets should converge (for example, Yeyati, Schmukler, & Van Horen, 2009).
It is a price-based measure that accounts for the cross-country variability of
MFIs’ interest rates to (new) loans to NFCs (see, for example, De Nicolò &
Juvenal, 2014). Both measures exhibit time variation, and this is important,
given that financial integration is a time-varying process as initially noted in
Bekaert and Harvey (1995). Indeed, the recent financial crisis has confirmed
this, as after decades of increasing financial and banking markets integration,
the trend was reversed (ECB, 2014, 2015).
We used secondary data from the Survey on the Access to Finance of
Enterprises (SAFE) conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) alone or
jointly with the European Commission (EC) mainly for the euro area coun-
tries. The survey seeks to periodically follow the developments in the
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financing conditions for SMEs compared to large firms. In this article, we
used data aggregated at the country level for the 11 largest euro area
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Spain)2 from the first 14 waves of the survey,
which allowed us to construct a country panel dataset and thus exploit both
the cross-sectional and the time dimensions in our empirical strategy. In
addition, the data allowed us to include in our models country-level deter-
minants and to make inferences at the country level.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, financing con-
straints appear to hamper significantly SMEs’ growth and the negative effect
is stronger for perceived than for actual financing constraints. Second,
increased banking markets integration fosters SMEs’ growth in the euro
area. The results were robust to alternative measures of banking market
integration. Third, we explained that reducing financing constraints – both
perceived and actual – is the channel through which the benefits of banking
markets integration transmit to growth, and the effect is particularly strong
when integration is captured through the intensity of cross-border lending to
NFCs rather than through convergence in interest rates to loans to NFCs.
The fact that SMEs’ growth was found sensitive to changes in short-term
lending rates is not unexpected given that SMEs are typically more indebted
in the short term (Daskalakis & Psillaki, 2008; Lopéz-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira,
2008; Titman & Wessels, 1988). Additionally, the interest rate integration
measure whose impact was found statistically significant refers to loans of up
to and including 1 million euros and these are considered a proxy for loans
to SMEs.
This article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant literature
regarding financial constraints and financial integration and the hypothe-
sized impact on growth. Next, we introduce the data, variables, and empirical
models. Then, we present the results, followed by a discussion of them. After
that, we provide several robustness tests. Finally, we conclude the article and
provide useful implications for policy.
Literature review and key hypotheses
Financing constraints as a barrier for growth
Financing constraints and their impact on firm dynamics have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. The traditional approach investigates how
sensitive firm investment is to financing constraints, proxied by a measure of
internal resources such as cash flow. Firm investment (growth) is typically
2Since 2014, Slovakia has also been included in every round of the survey. Besides these countries, the common
ECB–EC rounds also include the other (smallest) euro area countries as well as the UK and the other non-euro
area EU countries.
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proxied by the change in total or fixed assets (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002;
Fazzari, Hubbard, & Petersen, 1988; Guariglia, Liu, & Song, 2011;
Hutchinson & Xavier, 2006; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Quader, 2017).
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) show that SMEs’ growth is constrained by
the availability of internal finance (a cash flow measure) and that the effect is
much larger for SMEs with reduced access to external equity. Based on their
model, if capital markets were perfect, internal finance would have no impact
on growth as it could be substituted by an equal amount of external capital.
Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) reinforce the importance of cash flow for
growth and show that the positive effect is much larger for SMEs compared
to large firms, and for firms in transition countries compared to firms in
developed countries. Honjo and Harada (2006) show that the growth effects
of internal cash flow are larger for younger than older SMEs.
Later studies (for example, Bottazzi et al., 2014; Honjo & Harada, 2006;
Hutchinson & Xavier, 2006; Rahaman, 2011) depart from the investment–cash
flow sensitivity approach by considering growth in alternative size metrics
(employment and sales) as opposed to growth in assets (investment). They
also use an explicit measure of external rather than internal financing con-
straints. Bottazzi et al. (2014) proxy external finance constraints through credit
ratings which, they argue, influence the probability of receiving credit (posi-
tively) and its cost (negatively). They show that financing constraints undermine
growth such that constrained firms have a negative average growth rate, and
their impact is transmitted throughmultiple channels, namely: (a) the expansion
of the negative gap between large and small firms’ growth rates; (b) a reduction
in the ability of large firms to benefit from their diversified structure; and (c)
impact on the shape of the growth shocks distribution, so that constrained firms
exhibit a higher variability of growth episodes and are associated with profound
asymmetries in growth shocks. Consistently with previous literature, the study
also shows that financial constraints are more relevant for the more vulnerable
firms: those that are smaller and younger.
Rahaman (2011) shows that constrained firms are heavily reliant on
internal funds to support their growth. However, as their access to external
bank credit facilities improves, the impact of internal finance on growth is
weakened and external finance becomes the main source. As a result, firms
switch between internal and external finance dependent on financial con-
straints, a behavior that was found to be more frequent among small and
unquoted firms. This is in line with previous work by Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) and reinforces the idea that improving access to external capital helps
relaxing internal finance pressure on growth. In this study, we followed
a direct approach to capture firms’ financial constraints based on survey
data, as for example, in Ferrando and Mulier (2015), Casey and O’Toole
(2014), Holton et al. (2013), and Popov and Udell (2012), that allowed us to
distinguish between actual and perceived financing constraints.
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Given the purpose of our article, we considered the latter as a useful
measure in our empirical analysis as: (a) it is based on firms’ perception on
the severity of their access to finance problems; and (b) it refers to external
finance in general, including bank finance.3 Given the above, the first main
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a negative relationship between actual and perceived
bank financing constraints and the aggregate growth of the SME sector.
Banking markets integration and growth
A related aim of our study was to explore whether banking markets integra-
tion helps to alleviate financial constraints so that small firms’ growth
potential is less bound by their internal funds. The investigation of the
relationship between financial integration and growth is traditionally asso-
ciated with the finance growth literature (De Nicolò & Juvenal, 2014; Owen
& Temesvary, 2014; Hoxha, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Vollrath, 2013; Masten,
Coricelli, & Masten, 2008, to name a few). Most studies performed country-
level analysis and typically provide evidence of significant benefits. Yet there
are considerably fewer studies that investigated the banking markets integra-
tion–growth nexus at the firm level, and this is where our article intends to
contribute. The key questions we attempt to answer are the following: Do the
macro benefits of financial integration translate into real gains at the firm
level? Are SMEs able to reap the benefits of more integrated financial markets
by obtaining more and cheaper financial resources that ultimately will help
them expand?
Previous literature has identified direct and indirect channels through
which financial integration is expected to (positively) impact growth (for
a review see, for example, Masten et al., 2008). One of the most important is
related to access to finance. Based on Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) concept of
external financial dependence at industry level, Friedrich, Schnabel, and
Zettelmeyer (2013) argue that financial integration should make access to
finance easier and thus stimulate growth-enhancing investments. More
broadly, Masten et al. (2008) indicate that financial integration leads to
financial development, and thus indirectly to growth, by facilitating access
to foreign financial markets either through direct lending from abroad or by
listing on foreign stock markets. Hence, from the ECB’s perspective (full)
banking markets integration is equivalent to an efficient allocation of
resources to the most productive investment opportunities across the euro
3The period used in our study overlaps with the financial crisis period and does not allow for a pre- or postcrisis
analysis. However, as Ferrando and Mulier (2015) argue, financial constraints are more prevalent in crisis times
and this offers a unique opportunity for investigating their impact. Similarly, Campello, Graham, and Harvey
(2010) studied the impact of financial constraints on firms’ investment plans during the recent crisis and found
that, indeed, constrained firms operated cuts in their planned investment and adopted a more conservative cash
policy.
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area, without financial frictions affecting the cross-border flow of funds
(ECB, 2015).
A number of firm-level studies show that financial integration matters for
firm-level growth. Bena and Jurajda (2011) demonstrate that financial inte-
gration brought about by the Single Market in Europe fostered financial
development and thus positively impacted on EU15 firms’ growth. They
also contend that this positive effect suggests that there is no longer potential
for additional beneficial effects. Nonetheless, as noted before, there seems to
be some consensus that financial markets integration in the euro area is still
incomplete (Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, & Pagano, 2004; Pungulescu, 2013), and
that the recent crises have brought about fragmentation in the euro area
financial markets and especially in the credit market segment (European
Central Bank, 2014). Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) show that lending rates
converged slower than deposit rates in Europe before 2007 while both types
of rates diverged during 2008–2011. Focusing specifically on lending rates,
Wagenvoort, Ebner, and Morgese Borys (2011) document a considerable
degree of segmentation among the euro area countries for the period
2003–2008, although it varies with the type and size of the loan.
Pungulescu (2013) confirms the fragmentation in the EU credit markets
was induced by the financial crisis.
With respect to small firms, Giannetti and Ongena (2009) analyze the
impact of financial integration from the perspective of banking markets,
which is also the focus of this article, measured by the presence of foreign
banks in European transition countries. They show that a higher foreign
bank presence is associated with higher levels of sales, investment, and debt
and lower levels of cost of debt, but the benefits are lower for smaller firms
and highest for young firms. However, a few years earlier, Guiso et al.’s
(2004) study provided an opposite result as small firms were found to benefit
most as they gain access to more developed financial markets compared to
their local market. The more recent findings by Popov and Ongena (2011)
support our research purpose as they show that SMEs benefit from more
integrated European interbank markets as a result of a reduction in their
credit constraints and cost of loans, the integration benefits being transmitted
through the bank competition channel.
Overall, it seems that there are not unambiguous results on whether
financial integration can benefit SMEs. We help clarify this issue by using
recent data (2009–2015) for the SME sector in the most financially developed
countries of the euro area. Additionally, we focus on a specific segment of the
financial market (that is, the banking market), and to gauge the integration
we used quantity- and price-based measures derived from the literature. We
decided to use both types of measures due to the debate surrounding the
adequacy of each type (see, among others, Masten et al., 2008).
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Specifically, the first measure of integration refers to the country share of
the cross-border MFIs’ loans to NFCs located in the other euro area coun-
tries except the reference country. The share was computed relative to the
total loans by MFIs; that is, domestic loans to NFCs plus cross-border loans
to NFCs in the remaining euro area countries. This is one of the measures
that the ECB uses to follow the credit markets integration in the euro area
(ECB, 2015), and a higher value can be interpreted as evidence of higher
integration on this market segment.
The second measure refers to the cross-country variability in interest rates
to new bank loans (other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience
and extended credit card debt) with an original period/initial rate fixation
period of up to one year provided by MFIs to NFCs. This was computed as
the quadratic distance between each country’s rate and the euro area average,
similar to the measure used by De Nicolò and Juvenal (2014) for the stock
market integration, with the difference that we initially used the average for
the whole euro area instead of the 11 countries sample. We did this to be
consistent with the other measure where the cross-border loans refer to loans
to all the remaining euro area countries and not the remaining 10 countries
in our sample. We used interest rates for two size breakdowns: small amount
loans (up to and including 1 million euros) and larger ones (above 1 million
euros). We interpreted lower values of these measures as evidence of
increased banking integration. Therefore, we expected a negative relationship
between interest rate measures and growth. The second hypothesis can
therefore be split into two as follows:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): There is a positive relationship between the share of
cross-border loans and SMEs’ growth.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): There is a negative relationship between the interest rate
measures of banking markets integration and SMEs’ growth.
Regarding H2b, we expected a stronger relation for the measure related to
small amount loans as we strongly believe they are more relevant for SMEs
and thus more likely to be used (ECB, 2014). The hypothesized positive
effects from both channels mean that firms are expected to access loans
more easily and at a lower cost in more integrated banking markets and
they are consistent with the retail banking market integration definition itself
which, according to, for example, Rughoo and Sarantis (2012), implies more
unified and open markets and convergence of financial assets prices.
It follows that if SMEs are expected to benefit in terms of availability and
cost of bank loans, then increased banking markets integration should exert
an additional positive effect on SMEs’ growth through a reduction of the
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negative impact of financial restrictions on growth. Thus, our third and final
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Banking market integration has a moderating effect on the
relationship between financing restriction and SMEs’ growth.
The confirmation of this hypothesis would imply that increased banking
market integration in the euro area can contribute to relaxing SMEs’ external
financing restrictions and, therefore, has potentially strong policy implica-
tions. To accept this hypothesis, we expected a more positive (negative)
relationship when integration is measured by the share of cross-border
loans (interest rates).
The empirical strategy
The ECB/SAFE dataset
The data were drawn from the ECB/SAFE survey that provides firm-level data
aggregated at country level.4 The research reported in this article is based on the
results of the first 14 rounds of the survey (2009H1-2015H2) for the 11 largest euro
area countries (Austria -AT,Belgium-BE,Germany -DE, France - FR, Finland - FI,
Greece -GR, Ireland - IE, Italy - IT,Netherlands -NL, Portugal - PT, and Spain - ES)
as they were included in all the rounds of the survey and given our interest in
banking markets integration for this group of countries. Therefore, we constructed
a balanced panel sample of 154 observations.5
The reference period of the survey was the past six-month period preced-
ing each wave. However, there were small variations from one wave to
another for the first few waves.6
Based on our SAFE survey data, most of SMEs in the largest euro area
countries, as averages over the period, were owned by family or entrepre-
neurs or had only one natural person as owner. Conversely, the shares of
SMEs that were listed on the stock exchange were relatively low and ranged
from 1.5 percent of SMEs in Italy, 1.6 percent in Germany, and 2 percent in
Portugal to 6 percent in Belgium, 6.6 percent in Greece, and 6.9 percent in
the Netherlands. This was confirmed when we looked at the intensity of
using each type of financing sources. As expected, only a few SMEs in our
4The SAFE survey is conducted every six months by the ECB starting with the first semester (H1) in 2009 (and
together with the European Commission every two years until 2013H2 and every year since 2014H1). The survey
seeks to highlight the changes in SMEs’ access to finance in the past period of six months (SAFE Report, 2014H1).
5The original number of panel observations was 154. Tables 5–7 show the results computed on 143 observations as
we lost one observation per country due to the lag in the regression models.
6Thus, to have the same reference period for each corresponding wave of the survey (H1/H2) we applied a rule
based on most of the waves: namely, the first round for each year (H1) corresponds to the period of April–
September while the second round for the same year corresponds to the period October–March the
following year.
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dataset issued debt securities or benefited from new equity investments in the
six-month period preceding the survey. Thus, only 0.2 percent of SMEs in
Austria, 0.3 percent in Germany, and 0.6 percent in Belgium issued debt
securities while the highest shares did not exceed 3 percent (2.6 percent in
Ireland), except for Greece where there was an unusually high share of
14.1 percent over the period. This might be explained by the aftermath of
the financial crisis, as access to finance for SMEs in countries like Greece was
particularly difficult. Based on a firm-level SAFE dataset, Casey and O’Toole
(2014), for example, observe that Greek SMEs reported the highest usage of
market financing (equity and debt securities) among the same 11 euro area
countries included in our sample. However, they did not find any evidence
that bank-constrained SMEs relied more on market finance as an alternative
to bank lending. The shares were higher for equity investment, but even in
this case they did not exceed 9 percent (8.4 percent in Germany). As
expected, much higher shares could be seen for internal sources, coming
from retained earnings or sale of assets (41.0 percent in Ireland, 39.6 percent
in Finland), bank loans (excluding overdrafts) (35.5 percent in Belgium,
34.3 percent in Italy), and for credit lines, bank overdrafts, and credit card
overdrafts (59.3 percent in Ireland, 49.4 percent in Italy, 44.3 percent in the
Netherlands), as shown in Table 1.
Based on this dataset, we constructed our dependent variable (that is, the
growth in sales of the SMEs sector), the external financing restrictions variables,
and other firm-specific variables that we included as controls in our model. To
construct the banking integration variables, both quantity- and price-based, we
used data from ECB (see subsection Control variables on firms' characteristics).
Other country-level variables were constructed from data collected from various
Table 1. Financial structure of SMEs in the SAFE dataset (percentage).
Internal
funds
Bank
loan
Debt securities
issued
Equity
investment
Credit line, bank overdraft or credit
cards overdraft
Austria 33.5 32.7 0.2 6.4 38.3
Belgium 18.4 35.5 0.6 4.7 35.5
Germany 34.1 31.8 0.3 8.4 36.9
Spain 23.2 31.6 1.5 2.2 34.6
Finland 39.6 24.4 1.0 5.7 28.9
France 22.6 33.4 1.1 4.9 38.7
Greece 22.3 25.5 14.6 5.8 12.9
Ireland 41.0 29.4 2.6 6.2 59.3
Italy 23.9 34.3 1.5 2.2 49.4
Netherlands 20.7 26.1 0.6 2.5 44.3
Portugal 9.0 23.6 0.7 1.0 38.4
Note: The percentage of SMEs that reported using each of the respective sources of financing in the
past six month, as averages over the period 2009H1-2015H2, computed based on the ECB/SAFE
dataset. The SMEs category (small and medium enterprises) includes: micro, small and medium
enterprises. ECB/SAFE = European Central Bank/Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises.
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sources; namely, the ECB, Eurostat, and World Bank (World Governance
Indicators and Doing Business).
Variables
The variables used in the empirical analysis are defined in Table 2.
The dependent variable in all our estimations was the net percentage change
in the SMEs’ sector turnover (GROWTH). We used two measures of financing
constraints. The first represents the actual financing constraints with regard to
bank loans based on the negative outcome (rejected, got only part of the amount
requested, refused the offer because the cost was too high) of firms’ applications
for bank loans. It was used by Ferrando and Mulier (2015), but similar
approaches have been found in other studies. Casey andO’Toole (2014) employs
primary data from the SAFE survey to define two classes of credit-constrained
firms, credit-rationed firms (were refused a bank loan or received less than
75 percent of the amount requested) and self-rationed firms (declined the offer
because the cost was too high). The approach employed in this article covered
both classes mentioned above and was grounded on the idea that not only SMEs
that are (totally or partially) rejected by banks are likely to suffer from financing
constraints, but also those that choose to self-ration themselves when the cost
burden is deemed unbearable. We checked the robustness of our initial results
with a second measure of financing constraints, that is, perceived financing
constraints (FINPRESS), also based on Ferrando and Mulier (2015). It was
a measure of the perceived difficulty in accessing external finance (relative to
other problems). It did not focus on bank financing, yet it provided us with
a good opportunity to investigate how perceptions about the difficulty in acces-
sing finance impact on SMEs’ growth.
Control variables on firms’ characteristics
To capture the impact of internal funding on growth, we followed Rahaman
(2011) and used as a measure of internal funding the percentage of SMEs that
reported the use of internal funds (INTFUND). An additional way to capture
the impact of access to finance on growth is through financial structure.
Rahaman (2011) shows that leverage significantly and positively impacts on
growth in employment and sales, particularly for small and unquoted firms,
while Honjo and Harada (2006) document a negative correlation between
leverage and SMEs’ growth in employment and assets and a positive one for
growth in sales. Coricelli, Driffield, Pal, and Roland (2012) argue that there is
a nonmonotonic relationship between leverage and growth with a threshold
beyond which leverage can harm growth. The leverage-growth relationship is
thus significant, albeit not unambiguous. To investigate it, we included
a measure of the debt ratio (DEBTR).
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Age and size are the traditional determinants of firm’s growth (Cooley &
Quadrini, 2001). A negative relationship between age and growth is gen-
erally predicted as younger firms are expected to grow faster (Honjo &
Harada, 2006; Rahaman, 2011). Moreover, previous studies have revealed that
the determinants of SMEs’ growth as well as the magnitude of their effect differ
with the age of the firm (Nunes, Gonçalves, & Serrasqueiro, 2013). We captured
the influence of age by a set of variables measuring the proportion of SMEs
falling into four nonexhaustive age brackets (AGE1-4). With regard to size, the
empirical investigation of its effect on growth is commonly known as testing for
the Gibrat’s law, which hypothesizes that a firm’s current growth is independent
of its previous size (Nunes et al., 2013). Most previous studies invalidated it by
finding a statistically significant correlation, either negative suggesting that
smaller firms grow faster (Honjo & Harada, 2006; Rahaman, 2011), or positive
(Bentzen,Madsen, & Smith, 2012). To carry out this test, we proceeded similarly
as for age and defined four nonexhaustive size classes (TURN1-4) based on
turnover. Finally, we controlled for differences in growth opportunities across
economic sectors using the country share of SMEs belonging to four mutually
exclusive sectors (CONSTRUCTION, INDUSTRY, SERVICES and TRADE) as,
for example, in Nunes et al. (2013) and Giannetti and Ongena (2009).
Descriptive statistics based on the SAFE dataset
Tables 3 and 4 report the averages by country over the period for the
variables derived from the SAFE dataset. In terms of size, microenterprises
dominated in all countries, with the notable exception of Germany where
small firms were more common. Additionally, most SMEs had a turnover of
less than 2 million euros (about 50 percent or more) and were at least
10 years old (more than 70 percent).
Regarding the sectorial distribution, in all countries most SMEs operated
in the service sector (around 40 percent or more). Based on this and given
that the four sector variables added to 100 percent, to avoid multicollinearity
we took the services sector as our reference sector.
Turning to external financing constraints, the data showed relatively large
differences across countries. A considerable share of SMEs in Greece (32.5 per-
cent) perceived access to finance as being their most pressing problem relative to
others (for example, finding customers, regulation) compared to just 7.5 percent
of SMEs in Austria. In terms of actual financing constraints, the picture was
essentially the same. SMEs in Greece were most restricted from accessing bank
loans (54.4 percent), followed by SMEs in other Southern European countries
while those in Finland (15.6 percent) were least financially restricted. Thus, there
seemed to be quite a clear separation between the so-called GIPSI countries
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) and the remaining ones (Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, and the Netherlands). These differences
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were reflected in the distribution of growth rates for the aggregate SMEs sector.
Since for SMEs in the GIPSI countries, access to credit in particular and access to
external finance in general were especially difficult, they were also those who
experienced a reduction in their sales, on average over the period (from
−35.5 percent in Greece to −12.3 percent in Portugal). The only exception was
Ireland where the average net change in turnover was marginally positive
(1.3 percent).
In terms of leverage, while SMEs in all non-GIPSI countries deleveraged
by a sensible margin, SMEs in GIPSI countries either increased their leverage
(Italy and Greece) or reduced it but by a lower amount compared to the non-
GIPSI group (Portugal, Spain, Ireland). In terms of the intensity of using
internal funds (retained earnings and sale of assets), the variability was not as
high as noticed for the other SAFE variables, although the GIPSI countries
were among those exhibiting the lowest use of internal funds. This latter
remark could imply that the growth differential noticed above may not be
due to differences in their internal funding potential, but possibly to other
internal characteristics such as financial constraints. In subsection Actual
versus perceived external financing constraints, we provide a more in-depth
investigation of this intuitive finding.
Measures of banking markets integration
We used the country share of cross-border loans to NFCs in the other euro area
countries (CBLOANS) to total loans to NFCs as a quantity-based measure of
banking market integration (ECB, 2015). We defined this variable CBLOANS,
where CB stands for cross-border. Additionally, we employed two interest rate-
based measures computed as the quadratic distance between each country’s
short-term interest rates compared to the euro area average for new small (up
Table 3. Age and size structure of the SAFE dataset.
%
Micro
enterprises
Small
enterprises
Medium
enterprises
TURN
1
TURN
2
TURN
3
TURN
4
AGE
1
AGE
2
AGE
3
AGE
4
Austria 37.7 34.5 27.8 49.7 25.7 16.4 4.5 4.7 6.1 12.4 71.9
Belgium 47.1 30.0 22.9 48.0 24.7 17.2 4.6 1.6 6.6 12.5 77.5
Germany 31.4 36.1 32.5 48.7 28.4 17.2 3.0 1.9 6.5 11.9 74.0
Spain 52.9 28.5 18.7 62.5 22.1 9.8 1.9 1.1 6.8 14.6 75.0
Finland 39.5 32.5 27.9 50.3 27.9 17.3 3.8 1.7 5.7 12.1 79.2
France 43.3 31.6 25.1 55.2 24.9 15.6 2.1 4.5 9.2 16.0 69.0
Greece 66.9 20.2 12.9 69.1 20.4 6.4 1.1 1.2 8.1 15.5 73.7
Ireland 35.0 34.4 30.5 46.6 28.3 17.2 5.1 1.1 3.6 9.9 82.2
Italy 58.5 26.2 15.3 64.1 19.6 10.9 2.5 1.8 8.0 16.2 71.4
Netherlands 41.4 30.8 27.8 49.7 23.7 18.0 4.9 2.4 10.0 15.4 70.7
Portugal 52.8 27.1 20.2 69.1 19.2 6.2 0.7 1.2 5.5 17.0 75.0
Note: The average percentage of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) over the period 2009H–2015H2
computed on the European Central Bank/Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (ECB/SAFE)
dataset. See Table 2 for the definition of variables (TURN1-4 and AGE1-4).
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to and including 1 million euro) and new large (over 1 million euro) amount
loans. We coded the resulting variables IRDNLS_S (which stands for Interest
Rate Distance for New Loans with Small amounts and for a Short term) and
IRDNLL_S (Interest Rate Distance for New Loans with Large amounts and for
a Short term), respectively. By taking the quadratic instead of the simple
distance, we focused on the impact of the magnitude of the deviation from
the euro zone average and not on the direction of the deviation.
Data in Table 5 reveal that there were relatively large differences among
the euro area countries under study with regard to both measures of banking
markets integration. The largest values for the interest rate-based measures
could be noticed for Greece and Portugal; moreover, the variability seemed to
be higher for the interest rates to small amount loans (IRDNLS_S) than to large-
volume loans (IRDNLL_S), which is highly relevant for this study given that the
former is considered a proxy for loans to SMEs. These insights were confirmed
by the trends depicted in Figures 1 and 2, which additionally revealed an
increased variability since 2010 that started to recede in more recent years.
The share of cross-border loans in total loans to NFCs was relatively low
and a similar country pattern can be noticed (see Table 5 and Figure 3).
While Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, and Germany had time-
average shares above 10 percent, most of the countries severely affected by
the financial crises (Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) had the least intense
cross-border lending activity (about 1–2 percent). On an international level,
Bremus (2015) shows that, following the global financial crisis, cross-border
lending has dropped significantly and remained low. That author attributes
this trend to banks’ need to deleverage, due to changes in risk perception,
and to policy interventions aimed at stabilizing the domestic banking sys-
tems. Regarding the distressed euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain), Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2017) mention that their
tight bank-sovereign links dramatically affected investors’ confidence in the
domestic banking sectors of those countries and this could account for the
change in risk perception.
Other macroeconomic variables
We also controlled for concentration in the banking market, financial devel-
opment, and economic growth. Concentration in the banking sector was
found to significantly affect SMEs’ access to bank finance in several studies.
Craig and Hardee (2007) found that consolidation in the banking sector
negatively impacts on the probability of small firms to obtain credit and force
them to substitute it for nonbank financing. In the context of financial
integration, Popov and Ongena (2011) show that the benefits of European
interbank market integration on SMEs’ access to finance are conditioned on
the existence of a high degree of competition in the banking markets. To
20 M. MOSCALU ET AL.
proxy for concentration in the banking sector, we used the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for which we predicted a negative impact on
growth. We noticed that Finland has a highly concentrated banking system
while the other countries have either a moderately concentrated (Greece, the
Netherlands) or a competitive banking market (Table 5). However, as
revealed in Table 4, Finnish SMEs were the least financially restricted.
The literature has shown that financial development is disproportionally
beneficial for the growth of small firms compared to large firms due to the
decrease in the marginal cost of informational asymmetry and tangible collateral
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Figure 1. The evolution of monthly interest rate distance measure for small amount loans
(IRDNLS_S) over the period April 2009 to March 2016. Source of data: ECB - MFI Interest Rate
Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse. Note: Values are expressed in squared percentages. EA11
average = the average for the 11 euro area countries.
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Figure 2. The evolution of monthly interest rate distance measure for large amount loans
(IRDNLL_S) over the period April 2009 to March 2016. Source of data: ECB - MFI Interest Rate
Statistics, Statistical Data Warehouse. Note: Values are expressed in squared percentages. EA11
average = the average for the 11 euro area countries.
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requirements (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008a, 2008b; Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, &Maksimovic, 2005), and that it alleviates financial constraints
at entry especially with regard to access to loans for small firms and subsequently
helps them grow faster (Aghion, Fally, & Scarpetta, 2007). We thus expected
a positive impact of financial development, measured as the share to the gross
domestic product (GDP) of the volume of loans to NFCs (NFCL_GDP), on
SMEs’ growth. The data in Table 5 show that there are large country differences
regarding financial development, as the share of loans to NFCs in GDP ranged
from 42.0 percent in Germany to 174.1 percent in Ireland.
Table 5. Financial integration measures and other country-level variables.
CBLOANS IRDNLS_S IRDNLL_S HHI NFCL_GDP GDPCG
% %^2 %^2 Points from 0 to 10,000 % %
Austria 14.8 1.5 0.1 404.1 65.2 1.7
Belgium 11.1 1.7 0.2 1196.3 105.7 1.5
Germany 11.8 0.3 0.1 281.4 42.0 2.3
Spain 2.4 0.7 0.2 677.0 103.3 −0.6
Finland 2.2 0.7 0.1 3214.3 70.0 0.7
France 6.7 1.4 0.1 585.9 59.7 0.8
Greece 1.2 6.0 9.2 1678.1 63.0 −4.1
Ireland 13.0 1.1 0.5 674.7 174.1 4.7
Italy 1.1 0.1 0.2 398.6 71.1 −0.3
Netherlands 13.3 0.2 0.2 2073.7 98.7 0.4
Portugal 2.3 5.4 5.2 1182.0 93.2 0.4
Note: Average values by country over the period of study (2009H1-2015H2). See Table 2 for the definition of
variables. HHI = Herfindhal-Hirschman Index; CBLOANS = Share of cross-border loans by MFIs to NFCs;
IRDNLS_S = interest rate distance measure for small amount loans; IRDNLL_S = Interest rate distance
measure for large amount loans; NFCL_GDP = Share to GDP of loans to NFCs; GDPCG = GDP per capita
growth.
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Figure 3. Average monthly shares by country over the period March 2009 to September 2015 of
cross-border loans by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) to nonfinancial corporations (NFCs).
Source of data: ECB - Monetary Statistics - Balance Sheet Items, Statistical Data Warehouse. Note:
The values are expressed in percentages. EA11 = the average value for the 11 euro area countries
in the sample over the period March 2009 to September 2015.
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Tomeasure aggregate economic growth, we employed the growth rate in annual
GDP per capita (GDPCG) for which a positive impact on SMEs’ growth was
predicted. Some of the countries most affected by the financial crisis had negative
average growth rates in annual GDP per capita over the period, the lowest being in
Greece (−4.1 percent), followed by Spain and Italy; at the other extreme, Germany
had an average annual growth rate of 2.3 percent (see Table 5).
The empirical models
The model that we used to test our hypotheses, in its baseline formulation, is
specified in Equation (1):
Yit ¼ αþ X0it1βþ Z0it1γþW0it1δ þ V 0it1θþ dt þ μi (1)
μit ¼ vi þ εit (2)
where Yit is the variable GROWTH of the SME sector for the country i during the
semester t. The Xit-1 is the set of external finance restrictions (LOAN_CONSTR
and FINPRESS, for variables definitions see subsection Variables) and Zit-1
includes the remaining SAFE dataset variables referring to internal funding
(INTFUND) and change in debt ratio (DEBTR).Wit-1 is the set of bankingmarket
integration variables (CBLOANS, IRDNLS_S, and IRDNLL_S) and Vit-1 includes
the other country variables (HHI,NFCL_GDP, andGDPCG).We use the symbol ‘
in Equation (1) to indicate that the vector of variables is transposed. The vi
component inEquation (2) refers to the country time-invariant, unobserved effects
included to control for unobserved heterogeneity while εit is the idiosyncratic
error.
The explanatory variables in Equation (1) are lagged one period to avoid
simultaneity and deal with the causal relationship between firm and country
variables, on one hand, and growth, on the other, as in Honjo and Harada
(2006), because it accounts, at least partially, for potential simultaneity issues
(Bottazzi et al., 2014). By taking one lag of the independent variables, we
alleviated the endogeneity issues in our model (Roberts & Whited, 2012).
This is frequently done in firm-level models of growth as, for example, Chen,
Tan, and Jean (2016), Lee (2014), Rahaman (2011), and Honjo and Harada
(2006).
In all estimations, we include year dummies (dt). Given that our series were
at semiannual frequency, each of our year dummies take the value of 1 twice,
for both rounds of the survey corresponding to a given year. Following the
main literature (for example, Giannetti & Ongena, 2009; Rahaman, 2011), our
basic estimations were obtained via fixed effects (FE) models. Since there are
reasons to believe that access to finance (that is, external financing constraints,
in our study) could be endogenous (Bottazzi et al., 2014; Rahaman, 2011), we
JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 23
reestimated the model using an instrumental variable (IV) procedure, where we
instrumented for the actual and perceived financing constraints variables.
We also investigated how the beneficial effects of increased banking
markets integration in the euro area transmit to and impact on SMEs’
growth. Specifically, we hypothesized that increased banking integration
could help alleviating SMEs’ financial constraints, thus fostering their
growth. To test this hypothesis (H3), we reformulated our model specifica-
tion in Equation (1) by introducing two interaction terms between the
measures of financial constraints and measures of the banking markets
integration, as follows:
Yit ¼ αþ X0it1βþ Z0it1γþW0it1δ þ V 0it1θþ Xit1Wit1ð Þ0#þ μi (3)
All the vectors of variables in Equation (3) are defined in Equation (1). The
specification in Equation (3) helped us investigate whether banking markets
integration had a moderating effect on the hypothesized negative relationship
between financing constraints and growth of SMEs. This potential moderating
effect is captured by the # coefficient so that the total effect of banking integra-
tion on growth is given by the sum of the coefficients δ and # as in Equation (4):
@Yit
@W0it1
¼ δ þ X0it1# (4)
Similarly, the total effect of financing constraints on growth is obtained as in
Equation (5):
@Yit
@X0it1
¼ βþW0it1# (5)
Results
The determinants of growth for SMEs
The results of estimating Equation (1) are provided in Table 6. They show
that both firms’ characteristics and macroeconomic variables impact signifi-
cantly on SMEs’ growth in sales.
Regarding firm age, all four variables (AGE1-4) were significantly and
positively related to change in turnover, the magnitude of the effect being the
largest for the youngest SMEs (<2 years) and the smallest for the oldest SMEs
(10+ years), even though the youngest SMEs were the least numerous (based
on data in Table 3).
The results were less significant when it came to firm size. Nevertheless,
the coefficient for TURN4 was negatively and significantly correlated to
growth in Models 1 and 2 showing that the largest SMEs negatively
impacted on the growth in the overall SMEs sector and this effect was
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economically large. In terms of how the sector composition affected
growth, our results show that the average growth of SMEs in services
was higher than that in the construction sector, despite being the least
represented sector (Table 2), while the trade sector had a higher average
growth of SMEs than the one in services. Both sectoral effects were
economically large. Overall, our results show that younger and smaller
SMEs grew faster than their older and, respectively, larger counterparts
while the sectoral variation existed.
SMEs with a larger internal potential to finance their growth were system-
atically able to grow more, although the magnitude of the effect was relatively
small, consistent with the finding in Table 1 that internal funds (INTFUND)
was an important source of finance for all SMEs in our dataset. With respect
to leverage, however, our results show that SMEs reporting an increase in
leverage (DEBTR) found their growth hampered.
Whether bank financing constraints harm growth was one of our main
research questions. The results in Table 6 provide strong support for H1
given the significant negative relationship between the measure of actual
financing constraints (LOAN_CONSTR) and growth in sales.
In terms of the impact of macroeconomic variables on SMEs’ growth, the
results in Table 6 reveal that concentration in the national banking sectors
positively impacted on SMEs’ growth, although only slightly in magnitude.
We were especially interested to check if our hypothesized effects of the
banking markets integration on the growth of the SME sector were validated.
First, our evidence indicates that the higher the share of cross-border loans
by euro area MFIs to NFCs the higher the SMEs’ growth. Moreover, the large
magnitude of the positive coefficient of CBLOANS suggests that the effect is
economically important as well. Thus, taking steps for advancing financial
integration in euro area banking markets has a “growth dividend” as argued
by Guiso et al. (2004). There was, therefore, strong support for H2a.
Second, reduced cross-country variability across the euro area with respect
to interest rates to loans to NFCs (that is, a lower value of our measure of
distance from the euro area average, equivalent to higher interest rates
convergence) positively impacted on SMEs’ growth, thereby confirming
H2b. However, the effect was significant only when variability in interest
rates to small amount loans was considered, which is not unexpected, as
these are more relevant for SMEs and thus could be considered as a proxy for
SMEs loans, according to ECB (2014).
What are the channels through which the above-mentioned benefits of
banking markets integration on growth of SMEs are transmitted is an issue
we tackled in subsection Can banking market integration alleviate SMEs'
financing constraints? Specifically, we investigated the potential of increased
banking integration to alleviate the adverse effects of bank financing con-
straints on growth.
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Table 6. Firm- and country-level determinants of growth of the small and medium enterprise
(SME) sector.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
TURN1(−1) 0.234 0.357 0.501 0.592
[0.498] [0.492] [0.548] [0.552]
TURN2(−1) −0.172 0.055 −0.176 0.023
[0.688] [0.652] [0.723] [0.706]
TURN3(−1) −0.443 −0.161 −0.443 −0.213
[0.869] [0.936] [0.927] [0.994]
TURN4(−4) −1.951** −1.835** −1.23 −1.132
[0.792] [0.732] [0.868] [0.856]
AGE1(−1) 1.498*** 1.535*** 1.592*** 1.628***
[0.428] [0.450] [0.442] [0.461]
AGE2(−1) 1.360*** 1.276*** 1.384*** 1.309***
[0.426] [0.430] [0.450] [0.454]
AGE3(−1) 1.404*** 1.547*** 1.420*** 1.545***
[0.396] [0.394] [0.416] [0.409]
AGE4(−1) 1.057*** 1.069*** 1.129*** 1.138***
[0.330] [0.338] [0.335] [0.344]
CONSTRUCTION(−1) −1.421** −1.276*
[0.646] [0.645]
INDUSTRY(−1) 0.078 0.071
[0.473] [0.480]
TRADE(−1) 1.201** 1.234**
[0.496] [0.504]
SERVICES(−1) −0.024 −0.073
[0.385] [0.387]
INTFUND(−1) 0.186* 0.227** 0.217* 0.250**
[0.103] [0.112] [0.114] [0.124]
DEBTR(−1) −0.687*** −0.719*** −1.104*** −1.117***
[0.223] [0.243] [0.238] [0.253]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) −0.349** −0.360** −0.373** −0.383**
[0.150] [0.148] [0.168] [0.166]
HHI(−1) 0.019*** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.026***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009]
NFCL_GDP(−1) 0.091 0.001 0.138 0.062
[0.182] [0.188] [0.190] [0.190]
GDPCG(−1) 0.338 0.553 0.017 0.216
[0.538] [0.668] [0.543] [0.646]
CBLOANS(−1) 2.650*** 2.200** 2.203** 1.813*
[0.917] [0.963] [0.942] [0.958]
IRDNLS_S(−1) −2.303* −1.972
[1.192] [1.228]
IRDNLL_S(−1) 0 0.037
[1.365] [1.444]
C −190.140** −203.656*** −205.096*** −210.902***
[73.839] [73.036] [70.142] [71.191]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.836 0.829 0.813 0.808
F-statistic 21.745*** 20.730*** 19.711*** 19.118***
Redundant fixed effects test
(Chi-square) (36.559)*** (42.078)*** (44.380)*** (48.984)***
No. of observations 143 143 143 143
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the model in Equation (1). The dependent variable is
GROWTH. Variables are defined in Table 2. Robust standard errors (White diagonal) are given in brackets [].
The explanatory variables are taken with lag to alleviate the endogeneity problems. The null hypothesis
tests the joint significance of fixed effects and a zero p-value indicates that the effects are significant; they
are significant in all our fixed effects models. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Actual versus perceived external financing constraints
We then employed an alternative measure of financing constraints, that is, the
perceived financing constraints (FINPRESS), and reestimated Equation (1) by
keeping the interest rate–based measure for small amount loans and the sector
grouping that excluded the service sector. Overall, previous results with respect to
the influence of age, size, economic sector, internal funds, and leverage ratio held.
The new estimations yielded a negative significant coefficient for the variable
FINPRESS, which implies that not only actual financial restrictions impede on
SMEs’ growth but also their perceptions that access to finance is the most
pressing problem they face, relative to other problems. In addition, the coeffi-
cient is larger for the perceived constraints, which suggests that SMEs’ growth is
evenmore adversely affected by their perceived difficulties than it is by the actual
constraints. Additional support for H1 was thus provided. Regarding the per-
ceived difficulty of access to bank loans for European SMEs, Canton et al. (2013)
show that the youngest and smallest SMEs are the ones that perceive access as
being most difficult. The findings regarding the beneficial impact of increased
banking markets integration (H2a and H2b) were confirmed.
Can banking market integration alleviate SMEs’ financing constraints?
To test whether banking markets integration can alleviate SMEs’ financing
constraint, we introduced two interaction terms between the measures of
banking integration and the measures of financing constraints. The results
(Table 7, Models 6–7) show that both measures of financing restrictions
remained individually significant, but their adverse effect was intensified
given the larger magnitude of the coefficients. Again, the magnitude of the
impact of perceived constraints was twice larger than that of actual financing
constraints (−2.117 versus −1.010), which confirmed that it is an important
finding.
The positive intrinsic effect of cross-border loans to NFCs appears to have
vanished in both models, as its coefficient became statistically insignificant.
However, the coefficient # of its interaction term with both measures of
financing constraints was significant and positive. Taken together, these two
results suggest that the positive effect of increased cross-border lending activity
to NFCs on SMEs’ growth, previously documented, was now entirely captured
through the channel of financing constraints. In other words, increasing cross-
border lending activity of euro area MFIs to NFCs positively impacted on
SMEs’ growth by mitigating the negative impact of financing constraints on
their growth. Again, the moderating effect was much larger in magnitude
when we measured access to finance restrictions in terms of perceived con-
straints rather than actual constraints (0.175 versus 0.059).
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Increased convergence in euro area interest rates to loans for NFCs
depicted a different picture. First, its beneficial individual effect was main-
tained and even deepened in terms of magnitude (compared to the results in
Models 1 and 5). Second, it also had an indirect effect given the significant
positive coefficient of the interaction term between IRDNLS_S and each of
the two measures of financing constraints; however, this effect was significant
only when the measure of perceived constraints was considered.
Discussion
Regarding firm size and age as determinants of growth, our results are
supported by the extant literature. We found that the youngest SMEs had
higher growth rates compared to older ones, consistent with previous litera-
ture that younger firms grow faster (Bottazzi et al., 2014; Honjo & Harada,
2006; Rahaman, 2011). The importance of age in predicting (actual) finan-
cing constraints has previously been emphasized by, for example, Ferrando
and Mulier (2015).
The negative contribution of turnover for the largest SMEs may be due to
the lower growth opportunities of already large SMEs. This result rejects the
Gibrat’s law prediction, consistent with Rahaman (2011) and Honjo and
Harada (2006). Our finding that SMEs with greater availability of internal
funds are systematically able to grow more confirms previous findings (in
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and others), especially in Rahaman (2011),
that used similar measures of internal resources.
While the negative correlation between leverage and SME growth contra-
dicted the findings of some previous studies (Honjo & Harada, 2006;
Hutchinson & Xavier, 2006; Rahaman, 2011), it can be supported by others
such as Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) and Coricelli et al. (2012). The latter
argues that that there is a threshold level for leverage beyond which it can
harm firm growth. From this perspective, our results may suggest that SMEs
in the euro area countries are already highly leveraged or the cost of debt is
burdensome, an intuition that should be explored further in future research.
Our empirical analysis offers new evidence on economically and financially
developed countries in crisis, that constraints in accessing external (bank)
finance do hamper growth of SMEs. This is in accordance with previous
literature (Bottazzi et al., 2014; Rahaman, 2011), and it is also consistent
with euro area evidence brought by Ferrando, Köhler-Ulbrich, and Pál (2008)
which shows that micro and small firms, as opposed to medium and large firms,
are affected by financing constraints as their realized growth is limited by the
availability of resources and thus they are less able to take advantage of growth
opportunities. Given that financing constraints are more prevalent in times of
crisis (Ferrando & Mulier, 2015), the relevance of our finding is augmented.
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Table 7. Firm- and country-level determinants of growth of the small and medium enterprise
(SME) sector using alternative measures of financing constraints and interaction terms.
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
TURN1(−1) 0.23 0.217 0.27 0.332
[0.549] [0.564] [0.600] [0.516]
TURN2(−1) −0.244 0.013 0.117 −0.141
[0.706] [0.689] [0.767] [0.705]
TURN3(−1) −0.4 −0.357 −0.1 −0.362
[0.833] [0.850] [0.821] [0.891]
TURN4(−4) −2.141** −1.781** −1.470* −1.773**
[0.851] [0.831] [0.856] [0.825]
AGE1(−1) 1.305*** 1.181** 0.916** 1.580***
[0.397] [0.460] [0.385] [0.422]
AGE2(−1) 1.367*** 1.402*** 1.337*** 1.311***
[0.424] [0.402] [0.387] [0.412]
AGE3(−1) 1.181*** 1.186*** 0.883** 1.458***
[0.397] [0.396] [0398] [0.396]
AGE4(−1) 0.963*** 0.985*** 0.788** 1.068***
[0.322] [0.321] [0.301] [0.325]
CONSTRUCTION(−1) −1.333** −1.509** −1.350** −1.260*
[0.639] [0.620] [0.594] [0.654]
INDUSTRY(−1) 0.091 −0.105 −0.067 0.123
[0.477] [0.470] [0.463] [0.486]
TRADE(−1) 1.186** 1.089** 0.920* 1.221**
[0.518] [0.482] [0.491] [0.502]
INTFUND(−1) 0.193* 0.201* 0.259** 0.179*
[0.101] [0.109] [0.105] [0.105]
DEBTR(−1) −0.733*** −0.489* −0.565** −0.708***
[0.218] [0.251] [0.223] [0.227]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) −1.010***
[0.314]
FINPRESS(−1) −0.737* −2.117***
[0.412] [0.691]
LOAN_UNCONSTR(−1) 0.338**
[0.132]
HHI(−1) 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.022***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
NFCL_GDP(−1) 0.125 0.117 0.234 0.114
[0.177] [0.182] [0.178] [0.184]
GDPCG(−1) 0.347 0.669 0.765 0.307
[0.565] [0.601] [0.627] [0.549]
CBLOANS(−1) 2.637*** 0.915 0.503 2.665***
[0.968] [1.186] [1.432] [0.902]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) × CBLOANS(−1) 0.059**
[0.025]
FINPRESS(−1) × CBLOANS(−1) 0.175**
[0.074]
IRDNLS_S(−1) −2.777** −6.809* −9.494*** −2.563**
[1.187] [3.930] [3.530] [1.222]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) × IRDNLS_S(−1) 0.107
[0.087]
FINPRESS(−1) × IRDNLS_S(−1) 0.289**
[0.134]
C −179.665** −157.818* −153.973* −237.357***
[72.247] [79.901] [81.956] [79.804]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.833 0.843 0.847 0.835
F-statistic 21.282*** 21.537*** 22.328*** 21.541***
(Continued )
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With regard to competition, as national banking sectors become more
concentrated, for instance through mergers, acquisitions, or exit, our study
shows that SMEs grow more not less, as Craig and Hardee (2007) suggest,
but in line with Canton et al. (2013) who show that European SMEs have an
improved perception on the availability of bank loans in countries with more
concentrated banking sectors, as proxied by the HHI as well.
The higher significance of cross-country variability in interest rates to
small amount loans may also stem from the high cross-country heterogeneity
for this interest rate, as Wagenvoort et al. (2011) show that it was the most
nonintegrated lending rate before 2008 and, consequently, still affected by
country-specific factors. Similar conclusions can be drawn by comparing the
trends in Figures 1 and 2. Moreover, the cross-country variations for SMEs’
lending rates in the euro area was even higher after the onset of the financial
crisis, a development that the ECB has repeatedly warned about (ECB, 2015,
2014). Using the firm-level SAFE dataset, Drakos (2013) report a tightening
of the price conditions for euro area SMEs during the period 2009–2011.
Our findings on the potential of increased banking integration to alleviate
the negative impact of financing constraints on growth are broadly in line
with Canton et al. (2013) who show that increased foreign bank presence, an
expression of higher integration, is associated with improved perception of
loan accessibility by SMEs in the EU15 countries. It is also consistent with
Popov and Ongena (2011) who found that increased interbank integration
alleviates credit constraints for firms and lowers their cost of credit. Overall,
our findings show that euro area banking integration has both direct and
indirect effects on SMEs’ growth.
Robustness tests
For robustness, we performed several additional tests. First, if it is true that
the higher the share of constrained SMEs the lower the growth of the SME
sector (as we have previously shown), the reverse should hold as well (that is,
the higher the share of unconstrained SMEs the higher the overall growth).
Table 7. (Continued).
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Redundant fixed effects test
(Chi-square) (35.094)*** (38.107)*** (44.346)*** (36.1190)***
No. of observations 143 143 143 143
Note: Table reports the coefficient estimates of the model in Equation (1) (Models 5 and 8) and in Equation
(3) (Models 6 and 7). The dependent variable is GROWTH. Variables are defined in Table 2. Robust
standard errors (White diagonal) are given in brackets []. The explanatory variables are taken with lag to
alleviate the endogeneity problems. The null hypothesis tests the joint significance of fixed effects and
a zero p-value indicates that the effects are significant. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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We tested this by replacing the measure of actual constraints with the
opposite measure (LOAN_UNCONSTR), defined as the share of SMEs in
each country and survey wave reporting that their loan application was fully
satisfied. Our expectation for a positive correlation was also grounded in the
previous literature. Bottazzi et al. (2014) show that unconstrained firms
exhibited positive growth rates while they lowered or even turned negative
as the severity of financing problems increased. The new estimations are
reported in Table 7, Model 8. As expected, the coefficient for
LOAN_UNCONSTR was positive and statistically significant. Thus, an
increasing share of unconstrained SMEs led to an increasing share of SMEs
reporting growth in turnover. All the other findings remained unchanged.
Second, we dealt with the endogeneity of financial constraints. Specifically,
we suspected that our measures of financial constraints could be affected by
reverse causality given that higher growing firms are expected to generate
more internal resources and thus be less affected by financial constraints,
either actual or perceived. On the other hand, higher-growing firms are
riskier as they exhibit increased earnings volatility and increased agency
conflicts between managers and lenders, so the latter would be more reluc-
tant to extend credit to them. We used an instrumental variable (IV) proce-
dure to instrument for both measures of financial constraints. This method
has previously been used in the literature to address similar endogeneity
concerns (for example, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2008b;
Boubakri, El Ghoul, & Saffar, 2015; Popov & Udell, 2012).
We instrumented actual financing constraints with: (a) the perceived
evolution of SMEs’ credit history (CREDHIST); (b) the recovery rate follow-
ing bankruptcy procedures, at the country level (RECOV); and (c) the
regulatory quality of the government (REG, see Table 2 for the definition
of variables). The rationale for these instruments is as follows: (a) firms with
better credit history tend to have a better credit rating and thus easier access
to bank loans (Bottazzi et al., 2014); (b) firms in countries with higher
recovery rates may be perceived as less risky given that bankruptcy costs
are expected to be lower; and (c) better perceptions on the ability of govern-
ments to formulate and implement more effective regulations and policies
aimed at private sector development should help firms access finance more
easily. Perceived financing constraints is also instrumented using the measure
on the perception of regulations, discussed above. Additionally, we used as
instrument a measure on the perceptions of SMEs regarding the willingness
of banks to provide credit (BANKWILL, see Table 2). This was because we
expected SMEs to be less likely to perceive access to finance as problematic
when they have improved their perceptions about the willingness of banks to
provide credit.
The results of the IV estimation are reported in Table 8. The previous
results generally held, although they became less significant when the
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interaction terms were included. With respect to financial constraints,
Models 9a and 9b showed that their significant negative effect on SMEs’
growth was maintained, and the magnitude of their negative impact was even
deepened. Moreover, the perceived access to finance constraints hindered
SMEs’ growth to a greater extent than actual bank financing constraints did
given that the magnitude of its coefficient was twice as large (−1.822 in
Model 9a versus −3.877 in Model 9b), thus confirming the previous findings.
After the interaction terms were introduced, the individual effect of actual
constraints vanished (Model 9a).
Concerning the bank integration measures, our IV estimates confirmed
that a more intense cross-border lending activity of MFIs toward NFCs was
conducive to growth as the coefficient on CBLOANS remained positive and
statistically significant in Models 9a and 9b. Similarly, greater convergence in
interest rates to new loans for NFCs, which is equivalent to lower (quadratic)
distance of a country’s interest rates from the euro area average for short-
term small amount loans, favored SMEs’ growth, especially when perceived
financing constraints were considered (IRDNLS_S was significant at 1 percent
in Model 9b). When interaction terms were introduced, results were all
insignificant, both with regard to interest rates and cross-border loans
measures (Model 10a), whereas we found a significant moderating effect of
increased cross-border lending to NFCs on the negative impact of financial
constraints on SMEs’ growth (Model 10b). The nonsignificance of the statis-
tic of the Sargan-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions revealed that the
set of instruments used was valid in most cases and they reliably predicted
our endogenous variables. Overall, the IV estimations provide evidence that
the euro area banking market integration also mattered for SMEs and that its
effects were favorable, as also shown in Popov and Ongena (2011) for the
European interbank market. They also confirmed that there was a significant
impact running from financial constraints to growth, consistently with the
previous literature (for example, Bottazzi et al., 2014; Rahaman, 2011).
Third, a set of several additional robustness checks were performed by
employing alternative measures of our dependent and independent
variables.7 We reestimated Models 6 and 7 using growth in fixed investment
as the dependent variable (coded INVEST and defined in Table 2). The
results must be interpreted with caution as the SAFE survey reported data
on this item only from 2014H1. Overall, they suggest that financial con-
straints and banking integration impact on growth in fixed investment (that
is, a long-run effect) similar to the growth in sales (that is, a short-run effect).
However, the results are significant when actual financial constraints are
considered, thereby suggesting that long-term SMEs’ growth is affected by
7We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting these further tests. The full set of results are not reported in this
article for reasons of brevity, but they can be made available on request.
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Table 8. Additional tests using the IV procedure.
Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
TURN1(−1) 0.392 0.37 −0.168 0.251
[0.703] [0.646] [1.127] [0.547]
TURN2(−1) 0.624 0.25 1.564 0.615
[0.948] [0.834] [2.018] [0.723]
TURN3(−1) −0.215 0.012 0.102 0.356
[1.091] [1.009] [1.769] [0.861]
TURN4(−4) −1.375 −2.365** −0.686 −0.952
[1.232] [1.117] [2.178] [0.976]
AGE1(−1) 2.526*** 1.520** −0.155 0.541
[0.787] [0.621] [1.649] 0.552
AGE2(−1) 2.095*** 2.138*** 2.148* 1.459***
[0.670] [0.595] [1.181] [0.488]
AGE3(−1) 2.163*** 0.999* 0.194 0.352
[0.712] [0.595] [1.382] [0.552]
AGE4(−1) 1.821*** 1.333*** 1.055 0.646
[0.565] [0.450] [0.774] [0.386]
CONSTRUCTION(−1) −1.384 −0.921 −2.122 −1.315**
[0.795] [0.741] [1.369] [0.621]
INDUSTRY(−1) −0.054 0.018 −1.42 −0.279
[0.727] [0.668] [1.659] [0.567]
TRADE(−1) 0.988 0.907 0.188 0.546
[0.711] [0.655] [1.383] [0.568]
INTFUND(−1) 0.097 0.133 0.159 0.272**
[0.166] [0.150] [0.261] [0.129]
DEBTR(−1) −0.159 −0.398 1.429 −0.212
[0.0385] [0.311] [1.828] [0.288]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) −1.822*** −7.248
[0.589] [5.713]
FINPRESS(−1) −3.877*** −4.926***
[0.883] [1.149]
HHI(−1) 0.020** 0.020*** 0.014 0.014**
[0.008] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007]
NFCL_GDP(−1) 0.339 0.522** 0.557 0.536***
[0.230] [0.221] [0.519] [0.203]
GDPCG(−1) −0.949 −0.912 1.565 0.581
[0.793] [0.658] [1.315] [0.522]
CBLOANS(−1) 3.825** 3.763*** −11.788 −2.501
[1.512] [1.362] [11.911] [1.928]
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) × CBLOANS(−1) 0.519
[0.423]
FINPRESS(−1) × CBLOANS(−1) 0.430***
[0.120]
IRDNLS_S(−1) −1.921 −4.415*** −31.773 −14.222***
[1.519] [1.467] [23.348] 3.386
LOAN_CONSTR(−1) × IRDNLS_S(−1) 0.716
[0.565]
FINPRESS(−1) × IRDNLS_S(−1) 0.474***
[0.130]
C −277.850*** −223.477** 40.779 −123.838
[101.964] [89.056] [239.412] [76.926]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.649 0.561 0.463 0.458
(Continued )
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their investment plans and their corresponding ability to raise (bank) capital
to finance. In contrast, short-term growth (in sales) is sensitive to both actual
and perceived constraints with these latter having an even larger effect.
We also tested the robustness of our interest rate measure of integration
with three additional measures: (a) the level of interest rates; and (b) the
spread over the corresponding interest rates of a virtuous country
(Germany). In both cases, we multiplied our measures by (−1) to interpret
them in the same way as the measure based on cross-border loans (that is,
higher values are equivalent to higher integration). And, finally (c), we
employed the interest rate to new small amount loans (up to and including
1 million euros) with maturity over one year; however, there were gaps in this
series for Greece over the period considered. Our results showed no signifi-
cant effects for the new interest rate–based measures, either individual or
when interacted with financial constraints. In contrast, the positive effect of
cross-border lending on alleviating financial constraints was maintained
especially when the spread was used. Taken together, these results suggest
that the effect of convergence in lending rates on SMEs’ access to finance was
“less direct” and possibly less crucial compared to the effect of cross-border
loans to NFCs. The literature indeed provides evidence that the positive
effects of overall banking markets integration in the euro area on the avail-
ability of credit for firms are transmitted through the interbank channel.
Popov and Ongena (2011) found evidence that increased interbank market
integration in the euro area alleviates credit constraints for firms and reduces
the cost charged to them. Similarly, Bremus and Neugebauer (2018) found
that the reduction in cross-border lending to banks increases the likelihood
that SMEs will face higher credit costs.
We carried out some additional tests on the impact on SMEs’ age struc-
ture. We defined three age groups as follows: startups, up to two years old
(AGE1); middle-aged SMEs, defined by combining the shares of SMEs in
the second and third age brackets (AGE23); and mature firms, 10 years and
older (AGE4). The models were estimated using beta regression models
Table 8. (Continued).
Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b
F-statistic 6.880*** 8.420*** 2.510*** 10.840***
Sargan-Hansen statistic(Chi-square) 1.948 0.653 3.605 20.214
p-value (0.378) p-value (0.419) p-value (0.165) p-value (0.000)
No. of observations 143 143 143 143
Note: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the model in Equation (1) (Models 9a and 9b) and Equation
(3) (Models 10a and 10b) by instrumental variables (IV) procedure. The dependent variable is GROWTH.
Variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are given in brackets []. The explanatory variables are taken
with lag to alleviate the endogeneity problems. The two variables measuring external financing constraints,
actual constraints (LOAN_CONSTR) and perceived constraints (FINPRESS) are instrumented to control the
endogeneity of financing constraints. When the the Sargan-Hansen test statistic is nonsignificant, it illustrates
that the instruments used are valid. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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(Ferrari & Cribari-Neto, 2004) as the dependent variable is a proportion. The
results showed that financing constraints, both actual and perceived, had
a significant negative impact on young SMEs as their prevalence reduces the
share of startups; the effect was reversed for the share of mature SMEs
(10 years and older) with no significant effect on middle-aged SMEs. Thus,
it is the younger rather than the mature SMEs that are more likely to be
affected by financial constraints. With regard to banking integration in terms
of cross-border lending, consistent with previous literature (for example,
Bottazzi et al., 2014), startups seem to be less likely to benefit from increased
cross-border lending activity, but reducing their actual bank loan constraints
acts as a moderating factor. Overall, these results indicate that financing
constraints are most relevant for young firms, as they are more vulnerable.
Finally, with regard to the impact of macroeconomic controls, we reesti-
mated our baseline models by including a measure of inflation and its effect
was negative (as expected), but statistically insignificant. We also added an
explanatory variable capturing the SMEs’ perception of the difficulty of
finding customers as an alternative proxy for the demand addressed to
SMEs (drawn from the SAFE dataset and coded FINDCUSTOMERS in
Table 2). The variable seems to be a better predictor of SMEs’ sales growth
than GDP per capita, as it is found to be negative and significant when actual
constraints with regard to accessing bank loans were considered.
Conclusions
In this article, we empirically investigated the impact of access to external finance
constraints on SMEs’ growth in sales. Financial constraints were considered as
actual financing constraints as well as perceived financing constraints.
Additionally, we explored how banking markets integration in the euro area
can foster growth in SMEs and whether it could ease their financing constraints.
According to ECB (2015, 2014), the main negative trends in the euro area
banking market integration refer to the increase in the cross-country variation
in interest rates to loans for NFCs especially for SMEs, together with the
reduction of the cross-border lending among the euro area countries. This article
builds on the ideas that (a) access to finance is a barrier to firm growth, especially
for SMEs (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), and that (b) financial integration
makes external finance more available and at a lower cost and thus stimulates
growth-enhancing investments (Friedrich et al., 2013). Therefore, we sought to
shed light on the interconnection of these two factors by using survey data,
aggregated at country level, for the 11 largest euro area countries over 2009–2015.
Our main findings support the above expectations. First, our evidence
revealed that financing constraints significantly hamper SMEs’ growth and
that the negative effect is stronger for perceived than for actual financing
constraints. Second, we found that increased banking markets integration in
JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 35
the euro area fosters growth in SMEs. We measured banking markets integra-
tion in two ways: (a) as the share of cross-border lending to NFCs in the
other euro zone countries in total lending (domestic and cross-border) to NFCs
of a country; and (b) as the (quadratic) distance of each country’s interest rate
to new loans to NFCs against the euro area average. Third, we explained that
reducing financing constraints – both perceived and actual – is the channel
through which the benefits of increased banking markets integration are trans-
mitted, although the effect is much stronger when integration is captured
through the intensity of cross-border lending than through convergence in
interest rates to loans to NFCs. The fact that SMEs’ growth was found sensitive
to changes in short-term lending rates was not unexpected given that SMEs are
typically considered to be more indebted in the short term (Daskalakis &
Psillaki, 2008; Lopéz-Gracia & Sogorb-Mira, 2008; Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Additionally, this interest rate (quadratic) distance whose impact was found
significant refers to small amount loans (up to and including 1 million euros),
which are considered a proxy for loans to SMEs (ECB, 2015, 2014). Our main
findings regarding the impact of financial constraints and of banking integra-
tion on SMEs’ growth generally held when we used an alternative IV estimation
procedure that controlled for endogeneity of financial constraints, both actual
and perceived, although the significance of the results was reduced.
The findings in this article have strong implications for policies targeting
at alleviating financing constraints for SMEs and promoting their access to
external finance, particularly to bank loans as they significantly hamper
their growth. One way to do so is by reducing the fragmentation in
the euro area banking markets, especially by promoting MFIs’ cross-
border lending activity and aligning the cost of borrowing for SMEs to
stimulate their growth.
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